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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Erasmo Gambino, a federal prisoner, alleges that the 
United States Parole Commission improperly denied him 
parole. In particular, he claims that the Commission's 
conclusion that he was affiliated with an organized crime 
family was not supported by any evidence, and that an 
organized crime affiliation is not enough, in itself, to deny 
parole. Gambino filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the 
district court denied. Because we find that the United 
States Parole Commission abused its discretion, we will 
reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
Erasmo Gambino is currently incarcerated at the Federal 
Correctional Institution at Fairton, New Jersey. In 1984, he 
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin; two counts 
of possession of heroin with intent to distribute; and two 
counts of distribution of heroin, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
SS 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). Gambino was also convicted of use 
of a telephone in a conspiracy to distribute and possess 
heroin, a felony under 21 U.S.C. S 846, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. SS 843(b) and (c). On December 6, 1984, he was 
sentenced to a 34-year term of imprisonment and a 
$95,000 fine. 
 
Prior to the verdict, Gambino was cited for attempted 
escape from the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New 
York City. He was later found guilty and given a 30-day 
disciplinary segregation as punishment. 
 
All of these offenses occurred between December 1983 
and March 1984, before the enactment of the Sentencing 
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Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 
Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987. The SRA abolished parole, 
see SRA S 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027, 2031, but only for 
offenses committed after November 1, 1987. See Sentencing 
Reform Amendment Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217, S 4, 
Dec. 26, 1985, 99 Stat. 1728.1 Thus, Gambino was entitled 
to a parole hearing. 
 
On April 20, 1994, the United States Parole Commission 
conducted a parole hearing and Gambino was denied  
release.2 The Hearing Panel assigned Gambino a Category 
Six Offense Severity Rating because he had been convicted 
of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 but less than 999 
grams of pure heroin. See U.S. Parole Commission Offense 
Behavior Severity Index, Chapter Nine, Subchapter A, 
P 901(d), 28 C.F.R. S 2.20 (1995).3 The Panel assessed his 
salient factor score as 10 out of 10, with 10 representing 
the lowest risk of parole violation. See id. (Salient Factor 
Scoring Manual). The parole guidelines for a prisoner with 
a salient score of 10 and a Category Six offense severity 
rating indicate a term of incarceration of 40 to 52 months. 
See 28 C.F.R. S 2.20(b). The Panel assessed an additional 8 
to 16 months for Gambino's attempted escape from secure 
custody.4 The resulting aggregate guideline range was 48 to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The parole enabling statutes, 18 U.S.C. SS 4201 to 4218 (1997), were 
repealed pursuant to Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, S 218(a)(5), Oct. 12, 1984, 
98 Stat. 2027. Nonetheless, these statutes remain in effect for ten years 
after Nov. 1, 1987. Pub. L. 101-650, Title III,S 316, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 
Stat. 5115. For the sake of brevity, the subsequent history of the parole 
statutes will be hereafter omitted. 
 
2. To avoid later confusion when citing early cases regarding parole, we 
note that the Parole Commission is the successor to the Parole Board. 
Campbell v. United States Parole Commission, 704 F.2d 106, 111 (3d Cir. 
1983); Pub. L. No. 94-233, S 2, Mar. 15, 1996, 90 Stat. 219. 
 
3. The Commission does not indicate which edition of its regulations it 
relied upon, although it is clearly a recent one. The district court 
relied 
on the 1995 edition, as do we. 
 
4. The Commission's Notices of Action do not indicate under which 
provision this penalty was assessed. The district court stated that it was 
assessed pursuant to 28 C.F.R. S 2.36(a)(23)(1)(A). There is no such 
section, but it appears that the district court intended to indicate 28 
C.F.R. S 2.36(a)(2)(i)(A). However, on its face, this section does not 
apply 
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68 months.5 However, 18 U.S.C. S 4205(a) (1997) requires 
that Gambino remain incarcerated for at least 10 years 
prior to being eligible for parole.6 At the time of the April 20, 
1994 hearing, Gambino had served approximately 119 
months. Nevertheless, the Panel recommended that he 
remain incarcerated until the expiration of his sentence, 
solely because Gambino has been identified as a member of 
an organized crime family. 
 
The Panel also recommended that the case be referred for 
"original jurisdiction."7 Government's Supplemental 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to Gambino's attempted escape because it only applies "to the 
sanctioning of disciplinary infractions or new criminal behavior 
committed by a prisoner subsequent to the commencement of his 
sentence." Id. S 2.36(a). Gambino attempted to escape prior to the verdict 
and thus prior to the commencement of his sentence. Moreover, he was 
given a 30-day disciplinary segregation for this offense after he was 
found guilty. 
 
Because Gambino has not raised this issue and because his 
mandatory minimum sentence exceeds the guideline range with or 
without the additional 8 to 16 months, we need not decide if this 
increase in the guideline range was proper. 
 
5. The district court stated that the guideline range was 48 to 78 
months. This is incorrect and appears to be a typographical error. 
Because both figures are below the applicable statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence, the disparity has no effect on our analysis. 
 
6. 18 U.S.C. S 4205(a) (1997) provides that "[w]henever confined and 
serving a definite term or terms of more than one year, a prisoner shall 
be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of such term or 
terms or after serving ten years of a life sentence or of a sentence of 
over 
thirty years, except to the extent otherwise provided by law." 
 
7. The district court stated that this case was referred for "original 
jurisdiction" consideration pursuant to 28 C.F.R.S 2.17. Gambino v. 
Morris, slip op. at 4, No. 95-CV 4559 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 1996). However, 
the Regional Commissioner's May 13, 1994 Notice of Action indicates 
that the case was referred for further review pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 
S 2.24(a). S.A. at 17. Subsection 2.24(a), entitled "Review of Panel 
Recommendations by the Regional Commissioner," provides that 
 
       [a] Regional Commissioner may review the recommendation of any 
       examiner panel and refer this recommendation, prior to written 
       notification to the prisoner with his recommendation and vote to 
the 
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Appendix ("S.A.") at 16. On June 27, 1994, the Commission 
rendered an "original jurisdiction" decision by Notice of 
Action, determining that Gambino would serve until the 
expiration of his sentence. Id. at 18. The Commission 
informed Gambino that a decision to go outside the 
guidelines was warranted because Gambino was 
 
       a more serious risk than indicated by [his] salient 
       factor score in that [he has] been identified by the 
       government as a member of an organized crime family 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       National Commissioners for consideration and any action deemed 
       appropriate . . . . The Regional Commissioner and each National 
       Commissioner shall have one vote and decisions will be based upon 
       the concurrence of two votes. 
 
(Emphasis added.) The section entitled "Original Jurisdiction cases" 
provides that 
 
       [f]ollowing any hearing conducted pursuant to these rules, a 
       Regional Commissioner may designate certain cases for decision by 
       a quorum of Commissioners as described below, as original 
       jurisdiction cases . . . . Decisions shall be based on the 
concurrence 
       of three votes with the appropriate Regional Commissioner and each 
       National Commissioner having one vote. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 2.17(a) (emphasis added). 
 
The National Commission stated in its Dec. 7, 1994 Notice of Action 
that it had "original jurisdiction" pursuant to 28 C.F.R. SS 2.17(b)(2) 
and 
(b)(4). S.A. at 19. Not only is this inconsistent with the Regional 
Commissioner's Notice of Action, it is also facially incorrect. Subsection 
(b)(4) only applies to "[p]risoners sentenced to a maximum term of forty 
five years (or more) or prisoners serving life sentences." Because 
Gambino is only serving a sentence of 34 years, this subsection does not 
apply. 
 
Subsection (b)(2)(ii) would apply, however, if the case had been referred 
pursuant to section 2.17. See 28 C.F.R. S 2.17(b)(2)(ii) (Regional 
Commissioner may designate a case as "original jurisdiction" when a 
prisoner's offense "was part of a large-scale criminal conspiracy or a 
continuing criminal enterprise."). 
 
Notwithstanding these procedural irregularities, we need not decide 
whether Gambino was prejudiced by them because of the result we 
reach in this case. We note them only to ensure that they are not 
repeated on remand. 
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       and as evidenced by the body of an execution murder 
       victim found in the trunk of [his] automobile on 
       November 15, 1982. 
 
Id. The Notice of Action concluded that "[a] decision above 
the guidelines is mandated in that [Gambino has] a 
minimum sentence which exceeds the guideline range." Id. 
The body referred to in the Notice of Action was that of 
Pietro Inzerillo. Inzerillo was Gambino's cousin, and the two 
men jointly owned a pizzeria. Gambino claims, and the 
government does not dispute, that he was never a suspect 
in this slaying. 
 
Gambino appealed to the Commission's National Appeals 
Board, which affirmed the Commission's decision on 
December 7, 1994, by Notice of Action. Id. at 19. The 
Appeals Board stated that 
 
       [i]n response to [Gambino's] claim that the reasons 
       provided to exceed the guidelines are not a part of the 
       offense of conviction and therefore should not be relied 
       upon is without merit. The Commission may consider 
       available information to determine an appropriate 
       sanction for the total offense behavior. [His] claim that 
       the information used is flawed does not persuade the 
       Commission to change the decision. 
 
Id. 
 
In summary, the parole guidelines indicated that 
Gambino should serve a term of 48 to 68 months. However, 
Gambino was not eligible for parole until he served a 
minimum sentence of 120 months. He had a parole hearing 
after serving approximately 120 months and was denied 
parole. The Commission requires that he serve until the 
expiration of his 34-year sentence. 
 
If Gambino remains a model prisoner, he will be released 
after completing two-thirds of his sentence, a period of 
approximately 272 months. 18 U.S.C. S 4206(d) (1997).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. 18 U.S.C. S 4206(d) (1997) provides: 
 
       Any prisoner serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not 
       earlier released under this section or any other applicable 
provision 
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However, if he seriously or frequently violates prison rules, 
he will serve out his full term of 408 months. See id. These 
calculations exclude any possible reduction for good time, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 4161 et seq. (1997) (repealed by 
Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, S 218(a), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 
2027) (repeal effective Nov. 1, 1987, and applicable only to 
offenses committed after it took effect). 
 
Gambino petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas 
corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2241. The district court 
denied the writ. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
Our role in reviewing decisions by the Parole Commission 
on application for a writ of habeas corpus is limited. The 
appropriate standard of review of the Commission's findings 
of fact "is not whether the [Commission's decision] is 
supported by the preponderance of the evidence, or even by 
substantial evidence; the inquiry is only whether there is a 
rational basis in the record for the [Commission's] 
conclusions embodied in its statement of reasons." Zannino 
v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1976). See also 28 
C.F.R. S 2.18 ("The granting of parole to an eligible prisoner 
rests in the discretion of the United States Parole 
Commission."). Moreover, we must ensure that the 
Commission "has followed criteria appropriate, rational and 
consistent" with its enabling statutes and that its "decision 
is not arbitrary and capricious, nor based on impermissible 
considerations." Id. at 690. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       of law, shall be released on parole after having served two-thirds 
of 
       each consecutive term or terms, or after serving thirty years of 
each 
       consecutive term or terms of more than forty-five years including 
       any life term, whichever is earlier. Provided, however, that the 
       Commission shall not release such prisoner if it determines that he 
       has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and 
regulations 
       or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any 
       Federal, State or local crime. 
 
(Emphasis in original.) 
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Although the Commission must, in the first instance, use 
the parole guidelines in determining the release of a 
prisoner, 18 U.S.C. S 4206(a) (1997), it is not limited by 
those regulations. 18 U.S.C. S 4206(c)(1997).9 The 
Commission is authorized to "deny release on parole 
notwithstanding the guidelines . . . if it determines there is 
good cause for so doing . . . ." Id. The legislative history of 
that statute indicates the definition of good cause cannot be 
precise " `because [good cause] must be broad enough to 
cover many circumstances.' " Iuteri v. Nardoza, 732 F.2d 
32, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 838, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 335, 351, 359). Nonetheless, it is not so broad 
as to evade any definition. "Good cause" may include 
consideration of such factors as whether " `the prisoner was 
involved in an offense with an unusual degree of 
sophistication or planning or has a lengthy prior record, or 
was part of a large scale conspiracy or continuing criminal 
enterprise.' " Romano v. Baer, 805 F.2d 268, 270 (7th Cir. 
1986) (quoting H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 335, 351, 359). Moreover, "good cause" means 
"substantial reason and includes only those grounds put 
forward by the Commission in good faith and which are not 
arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, irrelevant or capricious." 
Harris v. Martin, 792 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing H.R. 
Conf.Rep. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 335, 351, 359). 
 
In reaching its decision to grant or deny parole, the 
Commission may consider a broad range of sources, 
including presentence investigation reports and "such 
additional relevant information concerning the prisoner . . . 
as may be reasonably available." 18 U.S.C. S 4207 (1997). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. 18 U.S.C. S 4206(a) (1997) provides that a prisoner may be released 
"pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission . . . ."; see also 
28 C.F.R. S 2.20(b), (c) ("These guidelines indicate the customary range 
of time to be served before release for various combinations of offense 
(severity) and offender (parole prognosis) characteristics . . . . These 
time 
ranges are merely guidelines. When the circumstances warrant, 
decisions outside of the guidelines (either above or below) may be 
rendered."). 
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The Commission must resolve disputes with respect to 
information presented by "a preponderance of the evidence 
standard." 28 C.F.R. S 2.19(c). 
 
On appeal, Gambino argues that: (1) none of the 
information relied upon by the Commission is rationally 
connected to the Commission's finding that he was a 
member of an organized crime family; and (2) there was not 
"good cause" to place his sentence outside the sentencing 
guidelines.10 
 
A. 
 
Gambino contends that the Commission had no evidence 
before it which rationally connects him to the Gambino 
family of La Cosa Nostra. We may inquire as to "whether 
there is a rational basis in the record for the Board's 
conclusions embodied in its statement of reasons." Zannino 
v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1976); see United 
States ex rel. Farese v. Luther, 953 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 
1992). While we may not weigh the evidence, we must be 
certain that at least some of it is rationally connected to the 
Commission's finding. 
 
The government argues that the Commission relied on 
four facts that support its finding that Gambino is a 
member of a crime family: (1) a Pennsylvania Crime 
Commission report indicating that Gambino is connected to 
the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra; (2) the discovery of 
Inzerillo's body in the trunk of Gambino's car; (3) a New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. At times, Gambino appears to be arguing that his due process rights 
under the Fifth Amendment have been violated as well. Because of the 
result that we reach here, we need not address this constitutional claim. 
See Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, Pa., 853 F.2d 1084, 
1093 (3d Cir. 1988) ("a court faced with both constitutional and 
nonconstitutional claims must address the nonconstitutional claims 
first, if doing so will enable the court to avoid a constitutional 
confrontation."). 
 
Gambino raised a number of additional arguments in his "Pro Se Reply 
Brief." We will "not consider arguments raised on appeal for the first 
time in a reply brief." United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
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Jersey state police report identifying Gambino as a member 
of the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra; and (4) a reliable, 
but unnamed, informant who identified Gambino as a 
member of the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra.11 
 
The government asserts that the Commission properly 
found that the Pennsylvania Crime Commission Report was 
evidence that Erasmo Gambino was a member of the 
Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra. But the Pennsylvania 
Crime Commission Report does not say what either the 
government or the Commission suggest. The sole reference 
to Erasmo Gambino in the report states that he is married 
to the sister of Rosario Gambino (his cousin), who, the 
report alleges, is a member of La Cosa Nostra.12 This 
attenuated familial tie does not, indeed cannot, in and of 
itself, provide a rational basis for finding that Gambino 
participated in organized crime. Thus, the Commission 
erred in concluding that this report stated that Gambino 
was affiliated with La Cosa Nostra, and accordingly, it is an 
invalid basis for the Commission's decision to deny parole. 
See Campbell v. United States Parole Comm'n, 704 F.2d 
106, 109 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[t]he Commission may not base its 
judgment as to parole on an inaccurate factual predicate."). 
 
For the government to assert that this reference 
constitutes evidence proving that Gambino is a member of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Gambino argues that the Panel only considered the Pennsylvania 
Crime Commission Report and the fact that Inzerillo's body was found in 
his car. The Initial Hearing Summary does, in fact, only rely on those 
two items. Plaintiff 's Appendix ("P.A.") at 7. The Pre-Hearing Assessment 
relies on those two items and one other for its conclusion. P.A. at 5. The 
Assessment mentions that the New Jersey State Police had identified 
Gambino as a member of the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra. 
However, nowhere does this Assessment explicitly mention that it relied 
on information provided by an informant. 
 
Because we find that the information provided by that informant is 
unreliable, we need not decide whether Gambino was further prejudiced 
by the failure to mention the reliance on the informant before and during 
the parole hearing. See Misasi v. United States Parole Commission, 835 
F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1987) (only weighing evidence presented at initial 
parole hearing). 
 
12. The entire report is not part of the record before us, but the 
government does not dispute this characterization of it. 
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the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra is, to say the least, 
a troubling exercise in conjecture. To rely upon the fact 
that Gambino is married to the sister of someone who is 
allegedly affiliated with the mafia as evidence that he, too, 
is a member of the mafia, is to adopt a rule of guilt by 
association. This would be impermissible even if Gambino 
were the son, brother or father of a confirmed member of 
an organized crime family. But Gambino's wife is not even 
that. The record in this case does not suggest that she is a 
mafiosa, only that she is related to mafiosos. We cannot 
understand how the fact that Gambino is related to 
someone who is related to a mafioso somehow makes him 
one as well. Nor does the fact that he is a blood relative of 
the Gambino family make him an ex officio member of the 
Gambino "family" of La Cosa Nostra. 
 
The discovery of Inzerillo's corpse in the trunk of 
Gambino's car, also does not link Gambino to La Cosa 
Nostra. At best, it suggests that Inzerillo, Gambino's cousin 
and business partner, was involved with, or perhaps the 
victim of, organized crime. But the record indicates-- and 
the government does not dispute -- that Gambino was 
never a suspect in the homicide investigation, and fully 
cooperated with it. This is a very important point. The 
discovery of a body in the trunk of a car -- particularly a 
so-called "execution murder victim," as the Commission 
described Inzerillo -- carries with it an undeniable graphic 
impact. It is almost natural to assume initially that the 
car's owner was not only involved in the murder, but in 
other unsavory activity as well. While we in no way mean 
to diminish the magnitude of this crime, we cannot see 
how, after investigators had determined that Gambino was 
not involved with that killing, the Commission can consider 
his proximity to it as a basis for the denial of parole. Under 
the particular circumstances of this case, we cannot hold 
that this evidence provides a "rational basis . .. for the 
Board's conclusion[ ] embodied in its statement of reasons." 
Zannino, 531 F.2d at 690. 
 
With regard to the New Jersey State Police Report, we 
begin by noting that evidence of affiliation with a crime 
family may be particularly amorphous in a case like this, in 
which confusions caused by appellation and genealogy 
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might interfere with the accurate assessment of Erasmo 
Gambino's criminal history. 
 
The New Jersey State Police report's conclusion that 
Gambino is linked to organized crime is, to say the least, 
vague. Although the parties have not included a copy of the 
New Jersey State Police report in the record, the 
Commission apparently relied upon a reference to this 
report in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum. 
Appellee's Supplemental Appendix at 54. The Sentencing 
Memorandum indicates only that Gambino "has been 
identified by the New Jersey State Police . . . as a member 
of the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra." Id. at 76. But we 
require evidence intended to establish a defendant's ties to 
organized crime to be more reliable than a bald assertion 
from an unverified source. See United States v. Cammisano, 
917 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 1990) (reliable information 
needed to justify upward departure for involvement with 
organized crime under Sentencing Guidelines); see also 
Cardarapoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990, 997 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(noting that government often has no basis for its 
conclusions that inmates "played a significant role in a 
criminal organization"); Coralluzzo v. New York State Parole 
Bd., 420 F. Supp. 592, 598 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 566 
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that "serious errors are 
often made by the Government in determining that an 
inmate has links with organized crime"); Mascolo v. Norton, 
405 F. Supp. 523, 524 (D. Conn. 1975) ("This is another in 
a series of cases which disclose the arbitrary classification 
of an inmate as a `member of organized crime' or`Special 
Offender' by federal prison officials without a rational basis 
in fact and without affording the inmate any procedural 
due process protections."); Catalano v. United States, 383 F. 
Supp. 346, 350 (D. Conn. 1974) (Bureau of Prisons' 
imposition of `organized crime' status must be done "in a 
rational and non-discriminatory manner."); Masiello v. 
Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (D. Conn. 1973) (finding 
no basis in fact for parole board to conclude that defendant 
should be given organized crime designation, as 
confidential presentence report was "replete with hearsay, 
inferences, and conclusions concerning alleged connections 
between [the defendant's] family and organized crime"). 
 
                                12 
  
The hearsay allegations of the "reliable, unnamed 
informant" are similarly flawed. While it is true that the 
Commission can consider hearsay, Campbell, 704 F.2d at 
109-10, this allegation, in the context of this particular 
case, is especially suspect. The appellant's name itself is 
sufficiently evocative to question the government's 
characterization of the informant's allegation that Erasmo 
Gambino is a member of the Gambino family of La Cosa  
Nostra.13 We have noted above that the government has 
mischaracterized the contents of the Pennsylvania Crime 
Commission Report, most likely as a result of the 
appellant's surname and familial ties. We are similarly 
concerned with the government's characterization of the 
informant's allegation: we were not provided with the 
underlying report from which the allegation is derived. 
Moreover, Gambino has not had the opportunity to 
challenge the veracity of the informant. 
 
To protect against arbitrary action, the government 
should have good cause for the non-disclosure of an 
anonymous informant's identity, and sufficient 
corroboration of the testimony. Cf. United States v. Fatico, 
579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) (subsequent history omitted) 
(at sentencing, district court can consider hearsay 
testimony of unidentified informant regarding defendants' 
involvement in organized crime as long as there is good 
cause for non-disclosure and sufficient corroboration). The 
government's summary of the unnamed informant's 
allegation is neither sufficiently reliable nor sufficiently 
corroborated to support the Commission's finding. See id. 
at 712-13 ("a significant possibility of misinformation" may 
justify the sentencing court in requiring "the Government to 
verify the information."); United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 
46, 60 n.23 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Misasi v. United States 
Parole Comm'n, 835 F.2d 754, 757-58 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(being described by unnamed local and federal authorities 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The record suggests that the Commission relied upon one reference 
in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum to the informant's 
allegation. The Sentencing Memorandum states that a "reliable 
informant . . . has been told by Erasmo Gambino that he is a member 
of the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra." Appellee's Supplemental 
Appendix at 77. 
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as largest distributor of illegal prescription drugs in report 
by the United States Attorney is not a "specific fact" for the 
purposes of the Commission's own procedures); cf. Zannino, 
531 F.2d at 691-92 (Parole Board may consider hearsay 
regarding membership in crime organization that was 
presented as sworn testimony during the course of a formal 
Congressional hearing where defendant and counsel had 
the opportunity to rebut it). Here, the corroboration of the 
allegation consists of the New Jersey State Police Report we 
discussed earlier, and no good cause has been shown for 
the non-disclosure of the informant's identity. The 
government's unilateral, untested assertion that the 
informant is reliable is not sufficient to overcome these 
shortcomings.14 
 
The Commission relied upon the above evidence to 
require that Gambino serve until the expiration of his 
sentence, adding anything from 12 to 24 years to the 
minimum period of incarceration required by statute. Yet, 
some of the evidence relied upon by the Commission is 
altogether speculative as to Erasmo Gambino's connection 
to the Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra. Other evidence 
only tenuously demonstrates the connection. The 
remainder is hearsay from unnamed sources. It can hardly 
be said that this evidence, in itself, provides a "rational 
basis in the record for the Board's conclusions embodied in 
its statement of reasons," Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d at 
691, and the denial of parole is arbitrary and capricious as 
a result. See id. at 689; see also Misasi, 835 F.2d at 757-58 
(reliance on one factually incorrect reason and one non- 
specific reason does not constitute "rational basis" for 
parole date outside of guidelines). 
 
In the context of a sentencing hearing, we have warned 
of situations where a substantial upward departure in a 
sentence becomes " `a tail which wags the dog of the 
substantive offense.' " United States v. Kikumura, 918 
F.2d 1084, 1101 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting McMillan v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. As Judge Roth observes in her concurring opinion, the evidentiary 
problem raised by the informant testimony is exacerbated by the fact 
that Gambino had no opportunity to present his own version of the facts, 
or to rebut or challenge the informant's alleged statements. 
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Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). In Kikumura we held 
that a greater evidentiary burden was required when the 
magnitude of a contemplated departure was extreme. 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101. Although the Parole 
Commission has greater discretion than a sentencing judge, 
we are concerned that it was willing to add one or two 
decades to Gambino's prison term based on the quality of 
evidence discussed above. A rational penal system must 
have some concern for the probable accuracy of the 
evidence it uses to make its decisions. See United States v. 
Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1975).15 
 
B. 
 
We consider next Gambino's contention that the 
Commission's failure to demonstrate "good cause" warrants 
his immediate release. The government argues that a 
remand to the Parole Commission is the appropriate 
remedy if "good cause" is found lacking. We agree. 
 
We have ordered a prisoner released on parole only under 
unique circumstances, which are not present in this case. 
Only "[w]hen a district court remands a case to the Parole 
Board for failure to adequately explain its decision and, on 
remand, the Commission again declines to articulate a 
basis for the identical conclusion, [may] a district court . . . 
permanently decide this issue on the record before it." 
Bridge v. United States Parole Comm'n, 981 F.2d 97, 106 
(3d Cir. 1992). See also Billiteri v. United States Bd. of 
Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) (in the case of 
non-compliance by the Parole Board, a "court can grant the 
writ of habeas corpus and order the prisoner discharged 
from custody."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Gambino also argues that affiliation with organized crime is an 
inadequate basis for denying parole, at least where an inmate's crime of 
conviction does not indicate organized criminal activity. We can envision 
circumstances in which an inmate has participated in organized criminal 
activity, yet that participation nonetheless does not indicate a 
likelihood 
of future criminal activity (for instance, where a member of a crime 
family renounces his allegiance or becomes a government informant). 
This argument, therefore, is not to be dismissed lightly. Because we have 
determined that Gambino is entitled to relief on other grounds, however, 
we need not decide this issue. 
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For instance, in Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933 (3d 
Cir. 1988), the district court remanded a habeas proceeding 
to the Commission with instructions to clearly explain the 
reasoning for its offense categorization. Notwithstanding the 
court order, the Commission reassigned the same offense 
severity level without providing an adequate explanation. In 
light of the protracted history of the case and the district 
court's impression that the Commission intentionally had 
evaded its mandate, the district court ordered the 
Commission to reassess the prisoner's parole status under 
a specific offenses severity category. We affirmed this final 
relief. We also have ordered the release of a prisoner who 
was denied parole in part because of his race, where a 
remand would have consumed several months, by which 
time his sentence would have expired. See Block v. Potter, 
631 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
In the absence of such unusual circumstances, however, 
it is clear that a remand is the appropriate remedy. See 
e.g., Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 692 (3d Cir. 1976); 
Billiteri, 541 F.2d at 938. In this case, although we have 
determined that the Commission's basis for exceeding the 
guideline lacks "good cause," it is conceivable that "good 
cause" may be demonstrated at a new hearing. Because we 
find no unusual circumstances, like those presented in 
Bridge, Marshall and Block, we will remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the 
judgment and remand the case to the district court with 
directions that it vacate its judgment and order. 
Furthermore, the district court should remand the case to 
the Parole Commission with directions that it conduct 
another Panel hearing within 60 days, and in a manner 
consistent with this opinion. Since Gambino has already 
served many months more than prescribed by his guideline 
range and his mandatory minimum sentence, additional 
administrative proceedings should be conducted 
expeditiously. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
The Parole Commission denied parole to Erasmo 
Gambino on the ground that he was identified as a member 
of an organized crime family. The majority found that in so 
holding, the Parole Commission abused its discretion. The 
majority determined that the Commission's conclusion was 
not supported by sufficient evidence, indeed that there was 
no rational basis to support the Commission's conclusion. 
I would, however, not reach the merits of the Parole 
Commission's decision, as the majority did, because I find 
that two procedural errors occurred prior to any 
Commission decision which errors prejudiced Gambino's 
right to a fair parole hearing. For this reason, I concur in 
the judgment of the Court as I, too, would reverse the 
judgment of the district court and remand for a new parole 
hearing. 
 
Congress has charged the Parole Commission with 
conducting parole hearings and thereafter determining 
whether a given prisoner is eligible for parole. 18 U.S.C. 
S 4201 et seq. In order to ensure that a prisoner's due 
process rights are respected throughout the parole 
determination, Congress both (a) codified certain procedural 
statutes to guide the Commission, e.g. 18 U.S.C. S 4206, 
and (b) authorized the Commission to promulgate rules and 
regulations to administer parole eligibility determinations in 
a fair manner. 18 U.S.C. S 4203(a)(1). The Commission, in 
response, established 28 C.F.R. S 2 et seq. The Parole 
Commission's handling of the Gambino parole hearing 
demonstrates a disregard of these rules and regulations, 
the sum total of which is a denial of Gambino's due process 
rights. 
 
First, Gambino did not receive an opportunity at his 
initial parole hearing to rebut allegations of organized crime 
until after the hearing examiner had ruled on Gambino's 
parole eligibility. This action on the part of the Parole 
Commission constituted a violation of 28 C.F.R. S 2.531 by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.     A prisoner . . . serving a term . . . of 5 years or longer shall be 
       released on parole after completion of two-thirds of each 
       consecutive term . . . unless pursuant to a hearing under this 
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failing to provide a hearing complying with 28 C.F.R. 
S 2.19(c).2 Second, after the Hearing, the Commission may 
deny parole but it must explain with particularity the 
reason for the denial and include a summary of the 
information relied on in making this determination. 
Gambino was denied proper notice of the factual allegations 
supporting the Parole Commission's determination that he 
was a member of La Cosa Nostra. The Commission violated 
18 U.S.C. S 4206(c)3 when it did not inform Gambino of an 
essential piece of information upon which it relied when it 
determined that Gambino was a member of La Cosa Nostra. 
 
Either of the these two errors is serious enough to 
warrant a reversal of the district court and a remand to the 
Parole Commission for a new parole hearing. Patterson v. 
Gunnell, 753 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (remanding for a new 
parole hearing upon finding of Commission's failure to 
comply with S 2.19(c)'s notice provision); Marshall v. 
Lansing 839 F.2d 933, 943 (recognizing that setting aside 
the Commission's action and remanding for a new hearing 
is appropriate where agency fails to comply with its own 
regulations) (3d Cir. 1988). I address each of these errors in 
turn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       section, the Commission determines that there is a reasonable 
       probability that the prisoner will commit any Federal, State or 
local 
       crime or that the prisoner has frequently or seriously violated the 
       rules of the institution in which he is confined. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 2.53(a). 
 
2.     The Commission may take into account any substantial 
       information available to it . . . and any aggravating or mitigating 
       circumstances, provided the prisoner is apprised of the information 
       and afforded an opportunity to respond. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 2.19(c). 
 
3. 18 U.S.C. S 4206 (c) provides in part: 
 
       The Commission may grant or deny release on parole .. . if it 
       determines there is good cause for so doing: Provided, That the 
       prisoner is furnished written notice stating with particularity the 
       reasons for its determination, including summary of the information 
       relied upon. 
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I. The Parole Hearing 
 
The Parole Commission held a parole hearing for Erasmo 
Gambino on April 20, 1994. At this hearing the Hearing 
Examiner took into account information regarding 
Gambino's alleged affiliation with La Cosa Nostra.4 
Specifically the Examiner relied on a Pennsylvania Crime 
Commission Report and a Government Sentencing 
Memorandum for Gambino's co-defendant Rosario 
Gambino, Gambino Pro Se Reply Br. at 11-13; Parole 
Hearing Uncertified Transcript ("Hearing Transcript") at 13; 
Petitioner's Supplemental Appendix ("PSA") at 14. 
 
There is no question that the Commission is entitled to 
consider the contents of these documents, but the 
Commission must provide a prisoner with notice that the 
information will be used as evidence to deny him parole 
and the prisoner must have an opportunity to respond to 
the evidence in the documents. S 2.19(c) ("[t]he Commission 
may take into account any substantial information 
available to it . . . and any aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, provided the prisoner is apprised of the 
information and afforded an opportunity to respond."); 
Patterson v. Gunnell, 753 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(holding that where the National Appeals Board had 
information unknown to prisoner and on which it relied, 
prisoner's case had to be returned for a new parole hearing 
so that prisoner would not be "deprive[d] .. . of a 
procedural protection guaranteed by the Commission's 
regulations."). 
 
Furthermore, the opportunity to respond to the evidence 
in the documents must take place before the Examiner 
proffers his recommendation. Section 2.19(c) explains that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Gambino with his pro se brief in this Court presented a copy of the 
uncertified transcript of the parole hearing. This record was not before 
the district court. Thus, it is not properly part of the record before us. 
Nevertheless, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 10, I will consider it to 
substantiate factual allegations made by Gambino as to the events that 
took place at the Hearing. This is appropriate particularly where the 
Parole Commission has never challenged the accuracy of the transcript 
or of Gambino's version of what transpired at the parole hearing as 
argued in his pro se brief. 
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after the prisoner has had an opportunity to respond to the 
evidence, if there exists a factual dispute, the Commission 
shall resolve it according to the preponderance of evidence. 
It is inconceivable that Congress intended this fact-finding 
to take place after a Hearing Examiner had made his 
determination to grant or deny parole. 
 
The Commission did not comply with S 2.19(c) here.5 
After an extensive discussion about Gambino's role in the 
offense of conviction and without mention of any of the 
evidence connecting Gambino to La Cosa Nostra, the 
ultimate basis for the denial of parole, the Examiner 
adjourned the hearing. Gambino Pro Se Reply Br. at 12; 
Hearing Transcript at 11; PSA at 12. When the Examiner 
called Gambino back into the room, the Examiner read his 
recommendation that Gambino be denied parole. Id. The 
Examiner explained that the reason for the denial was that 
Gambino had been "identified by the government as being 
a member of organized crime." Id. The Examiner further 
explained that the bases for his conclusion were the 
Pennsylvania Crime Commission Report and the 
Government's Sentencing Memorandum. 
 
The explanation for the denial of parole (at the conclusion 
of the hearing) was the first mention to Gambino of this 
evidence. Gambino was not given notice that this evidence 
would be used against him and he was not given an 
opportunity to respond prior to the Examiner's 
recommendation. The fact that the issue was discussed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Gambino described the procedure in the following manner: 
 
       Gambino and his attorney were instructed by the parole examiner to 
       leave the hearing room. After being called back by the parole 
       examiner, Gambino was informed of the parole examiner's 
       recommendation to serve to the expiration of his 34 year sentence. 
       The parole examiner then mentioned for the first time the 
       Pennsylvania Crime Commission report [linking him to La Cosa 
       Nostra]. A single question was posed to Gambino, and only after 
       counsel suggested to the parole examiner to ask Gambino if he was 
       a member of organized crime. The superficial organized crime 
       question came only after the parole examiner made his decision to 
       continue Gambino to expiration of his sentence. 
 
Gambino Pro Se Reply Br., at 12-13. 
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after the Examiner made his decision is not sufficient to 
prevent a violation of 28 U.S.C. S 2.19(c). As the 
Commissioner asserts, "the record reveal[s] that appellant's 
counsel spoke to [the issue of Gambino's organized crime 
ties] in the hearing" reiterating the district court holding. 
Parole Comm'n Reply Br. at 5. The consideration of the 
evidence must, however, take place before the Hearing 
Examiner has decided what the outcome will be and has 
made his recommendation. An opportunity to develop one's 
position on the merits, i.e., deny one's involvement with 
organized crime, after the Examiner has made up his mind 
and stated his recommendation, is not sufficient 
"opportunity to be heard." 
 
Even more troubling was the Examiner's apparent 
reliance on a New Jersey State Police Report conclusion 
that Gambino was involved in organized crime. This report 
was never mentioned at the hearing. There is passing 
reference to it in the Examiner's Initial Hearing Summary 
as evidence providing one of the bases for the conclusion 
that Gambino was involved in organized crime. However, 
the Examiner made no mention at all of the New Jersey 
report during the hearing -- either before or after he had 
made his decision. 
 
Following the hearing, Gambino appealed the denial of 
parole to the National Appeals Board. The fact that he may 
have had an opportunity to challenge the evidence on 
appeal is not sufficient.6 The procedural posture on appeal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. I recognize that Kell v. United States Parole Commission, 26 F.3d 
1016, 1022 (10th Cir. 1994), accepted the contrary proposition. There 
the Tenth Circuit held that, in the context of a parole revocation 
hearing, 
a prisoner was sufficiently "apprised of the information and afforded an 
opportunity to respond" within the meaning of 28 C.F.R. S 2.19(c), when 
he, being denied information at the parole revocation hearing, was 
afforded an opportunity to respond via pursuit of the administrative 
review process. Kell relied on Patterson v. Gunnell, 753 F.2d 253, 255-56 
(2d. Cir. 1985), where the Second Circuit held that S 2.19(c) was not 
satisfied where petitioner had no opportunity to respond when the 
National Appeals Board relied on aggravating circumstances of which 
petitioner had not been informed. However, the Second Circuit never 
passed on the issue before us. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit in Kell 
was ruling in the context of a parole revocation hearing, not an initial 
parole hearing where the due process liberty interests at issue are 
different. 
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of a denial of parole is completely different from that of the 
initial hearing on the merits. First, at the hearing the 
prisoner can submit live testimony (his own or a witness's); 
on appeal, the prisoner can only make written 
presentations. Compare 18 U.S.C. S 4208(e); 28 C.F.R. 
S 2.19(b)(4)7 with S 2.27(b).8 For example, if a prisoner had 
an alibi defense for prior uncharged criminal conduct that 
was being used as the basis for denial of parole, the alibi 
witness could testify before the Hearing Examiner; he could 
not before the National Appeals Board. Second, the 
standard of review of evidence submitted is different at the 
hearing than it is on appeal. At the hearing, the Examiner 
makes factual findings on a "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard; on appeal, the National Appeals Board 
owes some deference to the findings of the Hearing 
Examiner. Compare S 2.19(c)9 with S 2.26(e).10Thus, a 
prisoner, who has an opportunity to be heard only on 
appeal, must prove not only that his version of the events 
is true by a preponderance of the evidence, as at a hearing, 
but also that the hearing examiner, whose decision is owed 
some deference, was wrong in his preponderance of the 
evidence determination. This is a higher standard of 
persuasion. Third, a prisoner has a statutory right to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "The Commission will normally consider only verbal and written 
evidence at hearings." 28 C.F.R. S 2.19(b)(4). 
 
8. "Attorneys, relatives, and other interested parties who wish to 
submit written information concerning [a prisoner's appeal] should send 
such information to [the following address] . . . thirty days in advance." 
28 C.F.R. S 2.27(b). 
 
9. "If the prisoner disputes the accuracy of the information presented, 
the Commission shall resolve such dispute by the preponderance of the 
evidence standard." 28 C.F.R. S 2.19(c). 
 
10. Appeals . . . may be based on the following grounds: 
 
       (3) That especially mitigating circumstances (for example, facts 
       relating to the severity of the offense or the prisoner's 
probability of 
       success on parole) justify a different decision; 
       (4) That a decision was based on erroneous information, and the 
       actual facts justify a different decision. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 2.26(e). It would appear that review of factual determinations 
by the National Appeals Board is for clear error. 
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present at his parole hearing; he does not at his appeal. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 4208(e); 28 C.F.R. S 2.13(a). 
 
For all these reasons, the posture of a case on appeal is 
not the same as a hearing on the merits. A prisoner's 
opportunity at the hearing to rebut allegations of fact is a 
right protected by statute and regulations. His opportunity 
on appeal to challenge the veracity of facts, already 
established, cannot make up for the loss of his earlier right 
to be heard. 
 
Inferential support for this proposition is drawn from the 
fact that many circuits have held that the Commission may 
not rely on information undisclosed to the prisoner in 
determining eligibility for parole even if the information is 
subsequently made available to prisoners on administrative 
appeal. See United States ex rel. Schiano v. Luther, 954 F.2d 
910, 915 (3d Cir. 1992); Pulver v. Luther, 912 F.2d 894, 
896-97 (7th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. United States Parole 
Comm'n, 793 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1986). See also 
Liberatore v. Story, 854 F.2d 830, 838 (6th Cir. 1988 
(remanding to determine whether late received documents 
had to be disclosed). These cases all deal with violations 
of either 18 U.S.C. S 4208(b)(2) or 28 C.F.R. 
S 2.55 (Commission's obligation to disclose inculpatory 
information prior to a parole hearing), not of S 2.19(c), the 
regulation at issue here. However, they recognize the notion 
that post-hearing access to information does not remedy 
prior violations.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Gambino argues for the first time on appeal to this Court that he 
was not provided the requisite disclosure of documents prior to his 
parole hearing. Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 
2.55(a) instructs that the Parole Commission, at least 60 days prior to 
an initial parole hearing, must notify each prisoner of "his right to 
request disclosure of the reports and other documents to be used by the 
Commission in making its [parole] determination." Gambino argues that 
he was not provided such notice. Gambino Pro Se Reply Br. at 8. As a 
result, Gambino did not exercise his right to request disclosure under 
S 2.55. He claims that as a consequence he was ill-prepared at his parole 
hearing to refute the evidence of his involvement with La Cosa Nostra. 
We cannot determine from the record before us whether the Parole 
Commission violated S 2.55(a) as well. 
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In response to Gambino's argument that the Commission 
has violated S 2.19(c), the Commission has raised a 
procedural default issue of waiver. The Commission asserts 
that Gambino waived his right to appeal the S 2.19(c) issue 
because he neglected to assert this argument to this Court 
until his pro se reply brief. Ordinarily, an appellant's failure 
to raise an issue in a opening brief constitutes 
abandonment or waiver of that issue. See Republic of the 
Phillippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 71 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1994) (appellants required to set forth issues 
and present arguments in favor of those issues in opening 
brief); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
See also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). The rule serves two related 
purposes. First, it protects the appellee from the prejudice 
that results from the court's consideration of a late 
argument to which the appellee ordinarily cannot issue a 
written response. Second, it promotes the values of our 
adversarial system by ensuring that the court has heard 
adequate argument on a particular issue prior to rendering 
its decision. See Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d 
1272, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 1994); Hebert v. National 
Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C.Cir. 1992). 16 
C. Wright, A. Miller, et. al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 3974 n.4 (1996). Despite this rule, however, appellate 
courts may in their discretion consider issues not properly 
raised in an opening brief. The D.C. Circuit has stated that 
it will consider issues raised only in the reply brief - or 
issues not raised at all - when the error is so"plain" that 
manifest injustice would otherwise result. See Herbert v. 
National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C.Cir. 
1992). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also has held that courts 
may consider an issue improperly raised if failure to do so 
would create manifest injustice. See United States v. Ullah, 
976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992) (because manifest 
injustice would result in court's reversal only of 
codefendant's conviction, court would entertain defendant's 
argument for reversal despite fact that argument was not 
raised until reply brief).12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The manifest injustice exception is somewhat similar to the "plain 
error" rule, which is applied in the context of appeals from criminal 
trials, and allows appellate courts to consider defects at the trial level 
even when the defendant has failed to lodge an appropriate objection. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
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In addition to preventing manifest injustice, some circuit 
courts have expressed a willingness to consider an issue 
not properly presented in an opening brief where the 
equities favor the court's consideration of the issue or if the 
appellee is not likely to be prejudiced. See Ullah, 976 F.2d 
at 514 (Ninth Circuit willing to consider issue raised only in 
reply brief when government had already addressed the 
issue in consolidated brief and therefore suffered no 
prejudice); Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 
517, 522 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, I conclude that it 
is appropriate to consider the notice issue raised by 
Gambino in his pro se reply brief. First, the record clearly 
demonstrates that the Parole Commission never gave 
Gambino an opportunity to refute the evidence against him 
at his parole hearing. Were this a trial, this defect might 
very well rise to the level of "plain error." Manifest injustice 
would result if we were to penalize Erasmo Gambino for the 
strategic shortcomings of his attorney. Second, the 
government was not prejudiced by Gambino's late 
presentation of the issue in the reply brief because we 
permitted the Commission to file a surreply brief in 
response to Gambino's pro se reply. Consequently, the 
issue was fully addressed by both sides and therefore was 
subject to the intellectual rigors of the adversarial process. 
As such, I find the Parole Commission's waiver argument 
not to be persuasive. 
 
As a remedy for the violation of S 2.19(c), it is clear that 
"[a] court can set aside agency action that fails to comply 
with the agency's own regulations at least where the 
regulations are designed to protect the individual grievant." 
Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir. 1988).13 
Such is the case here. An appropriate disposition is to 
remand to the Commission to conduct a parole hearing in 
compliance with its regulations. Patterson v. Gunnell, 753 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96, 94 S.Ct. 
3090, 3101-02 (1974); Frisby v. United States Department of Housing & 
Urban Development, 755 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (3d Cir. 1985); D'Iorio v. 
County of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 685 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978); Bluth v. 
Laird, 435 F.2d 1065, 1071(4th Cir. 1970). 
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F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (remanding for a new parole 
hearing upon finding of Commission's failure to comply 
with S 2.19(c)'s notice provision). 
 
II. The Written Notice of Reasons for Denial of Parole 
 
In addition to violating 28 C.F.R. S 2.19(c) by not 
providing Gambino with notice and an opportunity to 
respond to the evidence against him, the Commission 
exacerbated matters by its subsequent failure to provide a 
summary of the evidence used in determining to deny 
parole, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 4206(c) 14 and its 
concomitant Parole Commission regulation, 28 C.F.R.  
S 2.13(d).15 16 Gambino had a parole hearing on August 20, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.    The Commission may grant or deny release on parole . . . if it 
       determines there is good cause for so doing: Provided, That the 
       prisoner is furnished written notice stating with particularity the 
       reasons for its determination, including a summary of the 
       information relied upon. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 4206(c). 
 
15.    In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 4206 the reasons for establishment 
       of a release date shall include . . . the specific factors and 
       information relied upon for any decision outside the range 
       indicated by the guidelines. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 2.13(d). 
 
16. In addition, it is quite possible that the Commission's behavior 
violated Gambino's constitutional due process rights. Several courts of 
appeal have found that the federal parole statute creates a substantial 
expectation of parole that is protected by the due process clause. See 
Kindred v. Spears, 894 F.2d 1477, 1481 (5th Cir. 1990); Solomon v. 
Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1982); Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 
522, 526 (8th Cir. 1981). While the amount of process owed a parolee by 
the Constitution is not clear, see, e.g., Evans, 662 F.2d at 526, the 
Parole Commission's statutes and regulations bind it to a higher level of 
procedural protection. See Kindred, 894 F.2d at 1481-82. As a federal 
agency, the Parole Commission has an obligation to abide by its own 
regulations and laws. See Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 941 (3d 
Cir. 1988). Because I find a violation of federal statute and regulations, 
the question of whether there was a violation of Gambino's 
Constitutional due process rights need not be decided. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., v. Transport Workers Union Of America, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 
1578 n.15 (1981). 
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1994, pursuant to which he was denied parole. Both federal 
law and Commission regulations require that the 
Commission explain the nature of the evidence relied on to 
deny parole. Section 4206(c) requires that the prisoner be 
"furnished [with] written notice stating with particularity 
the reasons for its determination including a summary of 
the information relied upon." Section 2.13(d) requires that 
"the reasons . . . [shall include] the specific factors and 
information relied upon." In an effort to comply with these 
requirements, the Commission, throughout the 
administrative appeals process prepared four separate 
documents purporting to summarize the evidence linking 
Gambino to La Cosa Nostra. All were inadequate. None of 
the Pre-Hearing Assessment, Parole Commissioner's Initial 
Hearing Summary, Regional Commissioner's decision, and 
National Appeals Board Notice of Action refer to the reliable 
informant, cited by the government in its sentencing 
memorandum for co-defendant Rosario Gambino, who 
linked Erasmo Gambino to La Cosa Nostra.17  Thus 
Gambino was denied any notice of arguably the most 
forceful evidence linking him to La Cosa Nostra and so was 
ill-prepared to contest this evidence on appeal. See Nunez- 
Guardado v. Hadden, 722 F.2d 618, 624 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that the purpose of requiring a summary of the 
evidence is so that prisoner can "fully exercise his right of 
appeal"). Furthermore, the combination of the failure to 
confront Gambino with such evidence at the hearing-- the 
violation of S 2.19(c), coupled with the failure to summarize 
the evidence post-hearing -- placed Gambino in a 
particularly difficult position. 
 
The Commission's claim in its response to Gambino's Pro 
Se Reply Brief that we should reject Gambino's claim 
because Gambino had access to the government's 
sentencing memorandum, which was a part of his central 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In addition, the Parole Commissioner's Initial Hearing Summary 
fails to mention the discovery of Pietro Inzerillo's body in Gambino's 
car. 
See Petitioner's Appendix, at 6. However, the Parole Commission 
arguably cured this deficiency after the case was referred for original 
jurisdiction, since the Regional Commissioner's decision cites the 
discovery of the body in Gambino's trunk as support for its 
determination. See Petitioner's Appendix, at 9. 
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file, see Parole Comm'n Reply Br., at 2, is weak. The mere 
fact that Gambino may have had access to the sentencing 
memorandum (and the informant's statements contained 
therein) is meaningless. Section 4206(c) requires the 
Commission to provide a summary of the information on 
which it has relied when it makes a "good cause" 
determination and denies parole. To construe the 
requirements of S 4206(c) as anything less than to require 
the Commission to identify the essential pieces of 
information that caused it to associate Gambino with 
organized crime, would be improper. Only with such 
identification, can Gambino be in a position to challenge 
this determination on appeal. 
 
In addition, the government argues that Gambino waived 
the S 4206(c)/S 2.13(d) claim, despite Gambino having 
raised the issue before the district court, see District Court 
Op., at 9-10, by not asserting it in his opening appellate 
brief, i.e., he did not raise it on appeal until he submitted 
his pro se reply brief. Despite the procedural default, I have 
considered this claim. I did so for the reasons stated in 
Section I: a) so as not to create manifest injustice to the 
defendant and b) since the Commission will not be 
prejudiced because we permitted it to file a Surreply Brief. 
 
The Commission's argument that Gambino failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies by not making this 
argument before the Parole Commission stumbles at the 
outset. Gambino could hardly have complained about 
inadequate notice of inculpatory information before he 
knew he was being deprived of pertinent information in the 
first place. 
 
Ordinarily, federal prisoners are required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2241. See Moscato v. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(prisoner must exhaust administrative remedy prior to 
challenging disciplinary proceeding in habeas petition); 
Tatum v. Christiansen, 786 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Unlike the rule requiring prisoners to exhaust state 
remedies, this rule is of judicial and not statutory creation. 
In either case, exhaustion is not required when the 
petitioner demonstrates that it is futile. See Rose v. Lundy, 
 
                                28 
  
455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1202 (1982) 
(exhaustion of state remedies not required where futile). Cf. 
Lyons v. U.S. Marshalls, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(in Bivens action, federal prisoners need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if futile or if actions of agency 
"clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or 
constitutional rights"). 
 
There is no question that Gambino appealed the Hearing 
Examiner's denial of parole to the regional and national 
levels of the Parole Commission. Throughout those appeals, 
Gambino maintained that the Commission had incorrectly 
identified him as a member of an organized crime family. At 
no point did the Commission indicate that it had relied on 
the "reliable government informant" for its determination 
that Gambino was a member of La Cosa Nostra. Since the 
administrative process failed to reveal to Gambino the 
Commission's reliance on the government informant, that 
process has proved itself to be futile. As such, the 
Commission's exhaustion argument must fail. 
 
It is clear that the Commission failed to comply with 
S 4206(c) or S 2.13(d) by failing to adequately summarize 
the information it relied on in denying Gambino parole. It 
is also clear that the district court relied at least partially 
on this information when it affirmed the Commission's 
decision. See District Court Op. at 8-9. For these reasons, I 
would reverse the district court's finding thatS 4206(c) was 
satisfied and I would join with the majority in remanding 
for another parole hearing, one which would comply with 
all applicable law, including SS 4206(c), 2.13(d) and 2.19(c). 
Patterson v. Gunnell, 753 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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